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POPULATION GROWTH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPME...~ 
Much of the concern about the effect of population size and its rate 
of growth on economic development is based on the simple idea that first, 
the more the number sharing the current flow of goods and services the 
less there will be for each, and second, the more the number and faster 
its rate of growth, the less of capital (human and physical) will be 
accumulated and hence, smaller will be the future flow of goods and 
services. In this view, the process of population growth is exogenous to 
the processes of income generation, accumulation, technical progress and 
institutional change. Once it is recognized that fertility decisions are 
made by households who are concerned about the welfare of their progeny 
and who respond to the relevant market prices, opportunities for 
productive use of their resources ·and public policy signals, population 
growth is seen to be endogenous. Unless externalities associated with 
private fertility decisions are pervasive and significant, no policy 
intervention in those decisions will be called for. An examination of 
possible externalities from the point of view of resource (exhaustible and 
renewable) use over time, capital accumulation, distribution of income 
within and between generations etc. suggests that many of the alleged 
deleterious consequences result more from inappropriate policies and 
institutions than from rapid population growth. Once the appropriate 
institutional framework and undistorted markets are in place, there is 
little scope for population policy as such. 
POPUI.ATION GROWTH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The influence of the size and rate of growth of population on the 
development prospects of developing countries has continued to attract the 
attention of economists, demographers and social scientists in general. 
The perceptions about this influence have varied over time from extreme 
pessimism to optimism and all positions in between. However, the 
accumulation of knowledge on the various factors that determine the 
fertility decisions of households and their consequences has led to a more 
informed view in recent years. Two influential studies are worth 
mentioning in this connection. The first is the World Development Report 
of the.World Bank devoted to the population issues and published in 1984. 
The second is a report of the Working Group on Population Growth and 
Economic Development of the National Aca~emy of Sciences (National 
Research Council 1986). Population and Development Review published a 
review symposium in September 1986 on this report to which A. C. Kelley, 
J. L. Simon, J. E. Potter and H. E. Daly contributed. Paul Demeny's 
(1986) presidential address to the Population Association of America was 
i~ part a forceful critique of the report. In addition, there have been 
surveys by McNicoll (1984), Kelley (1984), and Birdsall (1987). Schultz 
(1985, 1987), Pollak (1985) and Willis (1986) have discussed particular 
aspects of population growth and the approach to analysing the 
determinants of fertility. It is very difficult to add to these in terms 
of !1fil! substantive research conclusions. I will attempt only to highlight 
some of the issues discussed in the literature from analytical and policy 
perspectives. There will be very little discussion of facts, models and 
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econometric analyses of issues relating to population growth in the 
expectation that other papers in this symposium will adequately address 
them. 
At an elementary level the concern about population size could be put 
very simply: the more the number sharing the current flow of goods and 
services the less there will be for each. Equally, more the number and 
faster its rate of growth, the less per head will be accumulated over time 
of capital and other resources and hence, smaller will be the future flow 
of goods and services. Thus, in this view a large population size has a 
purely a negative influence: it reduces the slice of a given cake that 
each individual will be able to enjoy and the growth in the size of the 
, cake itself. Even at this elementary level it is easy to see that this 
assertion could be erroneous. First of all, the rate of growth of 
population is not exogenous to the process of economic development-­
household's fertility decisions a~e influenced by the opportunities for 
productive use of their resources, in particular the use of time and of 
savings that successful development brings about. Second, the size of the 
cake and its rate of growth through technical change and factor 
accumulation are themselves likely to be influenced by the size of the 
population in a positive way.· And indeed some writers, such as Julian 
Simon (1981), point to this very possibility to argue against the earlier 
perception of population growth as a problem. 
Even if the size of population does not positively influence the 
process of technical change, there may still be an argument that, other 
things being equal, larger population itself contributes to social 
welfare. One strand of this argument is that from the perspective of 
defending a nation against its enemies, the larger population size is of 
some advantage. For example, Nerlove et al (1987, p. 82) quote Edgeworth. 
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as referring to the view that larger population may be desirable, not only 
as an end to itself, but also for the sake of defense against competition 
with foreign nations, and that these considerations have perhaps the first 
claim on the attention of the statesmen; "being must be secured before 
well-being." They also generalize Edgeworth's argument by suggesting that 
a larger population has an advantage in providing pure public goods, of 
which national defense is only one example, because the per capita cost of 
providing a public good falls as the population becomes larger. 
Even if one were to accept that the population size and its rate of 
growth may influence social welfare, there still remains the question 
whether individual households, through their own choice of fertility 
subject to whatever constraints that they may face, would bring about 
socially optimal size and rate of growth of population. If they do, then 
the question of the population policy does not arise. Thus, in assessing 
the relevance of population considerations from a social point of view, 
no~ only one has to assess the evidence for the positive or negative 
effects, but also whether these effects are external to the decisions of 
individual households. However, even if individual households are 
altruistic in taking into consideration the welfare of their progeny, and 
even if externalities are absent, still there may be room for policy 
i~tervention if for some reason it was thought that the social welfare 
considerations differed from individual welfare assessments, particularly 
with respect to the weight to be given to the welfare of the unborn future 
generations. 
In a static world with given size of population and absence of 
externalities, it is well-known that at a competitive equilibrium the 
allocation of resources is pareto optimal. Such an allocation, however, 
may or may not maximize an individualistic social welfare function 
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(SWF).1 Analogously, in the choice of fertility, unrestricted equilibrium 
may be pareto optimal, but not necessarily social welfare maximizing. 
However, with fertility endogenous, even the concept of inter-generational 
pareto optimality is problematic because the pareto criterion is not well 
suited for welfare comparisons of equilibria with different numbers of 
people. The interested reader may wish to consult Dasgupta (1985) and 
Nerlove et al (1987) for a discussion of the issues relating to the choice 
of social welfare functions and the philosophical problems underlying 
their choice, in the context of population growth. 
In what follows the analytical and empirical knowledge relating to 
1the impact of population size and growth on the allocation of exhaustible, 
'renewable and accumulated resources will be reviewed. Second, the likely' 
influence of population growth on rates of technical change, accumulation 
of human capital and on the distribution of income within and between 
generations will be examined. In the concluding section, the vexing 
question whether there is any argument for public intervention in 
household fertility decisions and the nature of such interventions will be 
discussed. 
2. EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCEs2 
In assessing the impact of population and growth on exhaustible 
resources, it is instructive to begin by assuming that the resource 
requirement per person is some fixed number. If the total available 
resource stock is also fixed, then it is clear the two together determine 
the total number of individuals that can enjoy this stock of resources. As 
such, changes in rate of growth of population will only affect the time 
pattern of the use of this resources without affecting the total number of 
persons that will eventually use up the stock. If this resource is vital 
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for human existence, the world is bound to come to an end, sooner if the 
population rate of growth is more rapid or later if it is less rapid. 
However, once we get away from this extreme assumption that the resource 
requirement is fixed (so that by definition nothing else can be 
substituted for it) and allow for potential substitutes, then the problem 
resource exhaustion takes on a different complexion altogether. First, as 
a particular resource stock gets exhausted, the relative price of that 
resource would go up, inducing substitution of other resources for it and 
ultimately affecting fertility choice itself. Second, the rising price of 
a resource will also induce the search for substitutes, the success of 
~hich will extend the potential population that can be sustained. 
There is ample empirical evidence that resource exhaustion is not a 
major constraint on global economic growth, at least as yet. The material 
input per unit of GNP seems to be declining over the long haul. There 
appears to be a significant decline in real cost of resources (Simon, 
1981, Appendix) at least until recently. Nordhaus (1986) reports that 
real oil prices in America stood in mid-1986 at almost exactly the same 
level as in 1900! As long as the international markets for resources 
function well and the access to such markets are not restricted, the fact 
that some countries (e.g. Japan) are not well endowed with natural 
resources has not constrained their growth. Nordhaus' calculations, based 
on a. simple aggregative growth model, lead him to conclude that even for 
countries that import all their resource requirements, the drag on the 
growth rate, induced by rising real resource costs, is likely to be 
modest--a few hundredths of a percent per annum. 
It is sometimes argued that by slowing the rate of population 
growth one can postpone the exhaustion of currently available resources so 
that more time is available for the development of substitutes. This is 
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not an entirely convincing argument. After all, the returns to the 
development of substitutes depend on their prices. To the extent these 
prices reach a particular level later because of slower exhaustion of 
existing resources, it can only postpone the development of substitutes 
rather than accelerate their development. On the other hand, if one is 
referring to the development of as yet unknown substitutes, the search for 
such materials is also motivated by potential returns from successful 
search, once again the previous argument applies. But if one is talking 
about exogenous technological breakthroughs, then by definition their 
timing is not influenced by the developments elsewhere in the economy, and 
~s such, changes in population rates of growth cannot influence the 
timing. Be that as it may, the global use of exhaustible resources are 
primarily driven by income grow_th rather than by population growth. Even 
if the rate of growth of population is halted, with the desirable 
increases in the low levels of income in developing countries coming about 
through their economic development, their demands on resources would 
increase anywa,y. 
3. RENEW'ABLE RESOURCES 
One of the major renewable resources, whose flow is allegedly made 
unduly scarce by rapid population growth, particularly in developing 
countries, is food, or more precisely the services of arable land. A 
purely technical approach to this problem would be to put together an 
estimate of what the earth can produce in terms of food and divide that 
estimate by the requirement of food per person to arrive at a globl 
carrying capacity. If this global carrying capacity exceeds any likely 
future global population, then by definition there is no limit to 
population growth arising from constraints of the availability of food. A 
.. 
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study along these lines was undertaken jointly by the Food and 
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), United Nations Fund 
for Population Activities (UNFPA) and the International Institute for 
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). 
The objectives of the study were " ... to ascertain on the basis of 
land resource inventories, the potential population supporting capacities 
in the developing world with various levels of inputs. And, second, to 
compare these estimates with data on present and projected populations ... " 
(Higgins et al, 1983, p. 5). Some of the earlier studies are reviewed in 
Shah et al (1984). Their estimates of population potential varied 
depending on variations in each of the three inputs: estimates of arable 
land, yield per hectare and per capita consumption needs. The range was 
enormous: from a low estimate of 902 million by Pearson and Harper in 1945 
to 147 billion by Clark in 1967 (Shah et al, 1984, p. 5)! The 
FAO-UNFPA-IIASA study differs from the earlier studies in its use of a 
more disaggregated data base and superior methodology. Briefly stated, it 
uses an overlay of a climate map providing spatial information on 
temperature and moisture conditions on to a soil map providing spatial 
data on soil texture, slope and phase. This resulted in dividing the 
study area into grids, each covering an area of 100 square kilometers 
area. In all, 14 major climates during growth period were distinguished 
with ·normal (i.e. containing a humid period) length of the growing period 
(LGP) divided into 13 intervals and intermediate (with no humid period) 
LGP being divided into six intervals. Fifteen most widely grown food 
crops, namely, wheat, rice, maize, barley, sorghum, pearl millet, white 
potato, sweet potato, cassava, phaselous bean, soybean, groundnut, sugar 
cane, bananas/plantain and oil palm were considered. Three alternative 
levels of farm technology (low, intermediate and high) varying from no 
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change in existing cropping patterns, no use of fertilizers and pesticides 
and no mechanization to optimum use of plant genetic potential, along with 
needed fertilizers and pesticides and full mechanization are postulated. 
The soil characteristic, climate, growing season length, technology 
and cropping pattern, together with the requirement that production be 
sustainable (i.e. that appropriate fallowing requirements and soil 
conservation measures are allowed for), determine the production potential 
in each of the soil-climate grids. These are then aggregated to yield 
production potential at the level of a country. After deduction of seed, 
feed and wastage one then obtains the crop-wise potential output available 
for human consumption. Livestock production potential was also assessed, 
both under the assumption that only grassland will be used to support 
herds, and under the assumption crop residues and by-products will be used 
as well (Shah et al 1984, p. 32). Given the average energy (measured in 
kilo calories per day) and protein (in grams per day) requirements based 
on the 1973 recommendations of an expert committee of FAO and World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the age and sex distribution of the population of a 
country and the production available for human consumption in terms of 
energy-and protein, the maximum population that can be supported can be 
determined. The results are shown in Table 1. In this table "critical" 
countries are the ones that cannot meet the basic food needs of their 
population even if all their arable land were devoted to growing food 
crops, and "limited" countries are the ones that cannot meet these needs 
if part of their arable land has to be diverted to produce other food and 
non-food cash crops. Finally, "surplus" countries are the ones that meet 
their food as well as other non-food requirements. 
It should be noted that the population carrying capacity, reported in 
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if all arable land was devoted to crop production and this exceeds their 
projected population in year 2000. However, if a third of all land is 
assumed to be devoted to other crops and the carrying capacity 
correspondingly reduced by a third, the projected population (by year 
2000) of these countries will exceed the reduced carrying capacity. This 
is why they are listed under the category "limited." Since in many 
countries of the developing world population will still be growing in year 
2000, Shah et al (1984) compare population carrying capacity with the 
hypothetical size of stationary population. In this comparison, even with 
a high level of technology, eleven countries cannot support the size of 
~heir stationary population, the most populous among them being Bangladesh 
, which is expected to reach a stationary population of 430 million in year·· 
2035. Eight countries can support their stationary population only at a 
high level of technology, but of the most populous among them, namely 
Nigeria, the balance between carrying capacity (701 million) and 
stationary population (623 million) is too close for comfort. 
Yet anot~er study of this nature is by Bernard Gilland (1983). By 
multiplying an assumed maximum yield of 5 tons of grain equivalent per 
hectare and an assumed (indefinitely sustainable) availability of 1.5 
billion hectares of land, he obtains a maximum global output of 7.5 
billion tons of grain equivalent. Gilland's assumption that "a completely 
satisfactory" diet including some meat will involve an average daily total 
intake (direct and indirect through livestock products) of 9000 kilo 
calories per capita of "plant energy" leads him to conclude that the earth 
can support 7.5 billion people. A projected stationary population of 
roughly 11.~ billion people can be supported at a consumption about 6000 
kilo calories per capita. 
What inference can one draw from such studies? It would appear that 
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there is technological capability and land resources to sustain a 
population of as high as 33 billion (or nearly 9 times the projected 
population of 3.6 billion in year 2000) in the five regions of the world 
included in the FAO-IIASA study. But this by itself is no cause for 
complacency since there is virtually no economic analysis underlying these 
projections, even though their data base and assumptions regarding 
technology are considerably more sophisticated and far more spatially 
disaggregated than any of the earlier studies of the same genre. Since 
farming is done by millions of individual peasants, unless it is in their 
private economic interest, given the prices for inputs and outputs they 
face and the constraints to which they are subject, they will not produce 
a particular set and levels of crop outputs merely because it is 
agro-climatieally and technoloically feasible to produce it. ·In 
particular, the investments in land; capital equipment, livestock, 
technical skills and knowledge needed to attain the potential output will 
not be forthcoming unless the returns are adequate. By asking whether 
each country or region within a country has the potential to sustain its 
projected year 2000 or its stationary population, one completely ignores 
the economic cost of such autarkic development even if it were feasible to 
do so. Thus, fundamental ideas of comparative advantage and gains from 
trade between regions within a country and between countries are 
conspicuous by their absence in such analyses. At best these studies are 
useful in pinpointing countries where, with a technology which raises the 
output per unit of land to the fullest extent, even current level of 
population cannot be sustained relying solely on home production. This 
may be taken as indicating the need for out-migration of a part of its 
population or for investment in production for exports to pay for food 
imports or some combination of both. 
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Besides the population carrying capacity study, IIASA also engaged in 
a major research project on food and agriculture. This project built a 
system of sequential general equilibrium models (Parikh and Rabar (1981). 
These included 19 individual country models and three regional models (the 
European Community, Eastern Europe, including USUR and a residual rest of 
the world. The models were linked into a global trading system, in which 
the world markets for the ten aggregate commodities (9 agricultural and 
one non-agricultural) cleared to determine the time path of equilibrium 
world prices. Depending on the trade policy pursued by each country, the 
domestic prices can differ from world prices to a greater or lesser 
extent. The linked system of models were intended mainly to analyze the 
· implications of liberalized agricultural trade and to explore possible 
national and international policies for alleviating hunger in the 
developing world. In these models, the growth of population until the 
year 2000 was assumed to follow the medium projections of the United 
Nations. The simulations suggest that given the exogenously specified 
real income and population growth in the countries and regions of the 
model, the global agricultural system can meet the effective demands 
placed on it till 2000 without significant changes in relative prices. 
While there is some reduction -in the proportion of the global population 
that is hungry by year 2000 mainly due to projected income growth, 
policies, such as liberalization of agricultural trade etc, that do not 
involve global redistribution of incomes or assets do not significantly 
affect the number of hungry persons. 
The India model of the IIASA linked system was, however, used to· 
simulate the effects of varying the rate of growth of India's population 
between 1980 and 2000. I~ is more elaborate than others in the system in 
that it distinguishes five income (more precisely, per capita real 
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consumption expenditure) groups among rural and urban populations with the 
groups nwnbered according to increasing affluence (i.e. group 1 is the 
poorest and group 5 is the richest in both rural and urban areas). Each 
group has its own demand function represented by a Stone-Geary linear 
expenditure system and the distribution of aggregate consumer expenditure 
among groups is assumed to be log-normal. In this model population growth 
is exogenously specified and influences only the demand module. Three 
alternative growth paths were specified: Alternative 1 corresponds to 
IIASA's reference projection, Alternative 2 corresponds to the standard 
projections for year 200 and Alterntive 3 corresponds to the rapid 
) 
fertility decline and standard mortality decline projection of the World 
Bank (1984). There is a difference of 121 million between the projections 
of Alternative 1 and 3 by year 2000. The model was run in a stand-alone 
mode with the time path of the international price vector faced by India 
exogenously specified to be the same as that emerging as the equilibrium 
path in the Linked reference run. For the reason that population 
influences only per capita income and demand and not the production 
process, the differenc~s between the alternatives are not large (see Table 
2). As is to be expected, Alternative 3 with the slowest population 
growth leads to a minuscule speeding up in the rate of growth of real GDP. 
However, the impact on energy intake and in the distribution of population 
among expenditure groups is more perceptible. In general, for all groups 
energy intake increases as population growth decreases, and the 
distribution of income improves as a higher proportion of the population 
move to richer expenditure classes, particularly in the urban areas. But 
the changes associated with a smaller population size are modest. 
The recent famines in some parts of sub-Saharan Africa have led some 
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Table 2 
Projections from India Model of IIASA 
Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3 
1. Population 
(Millions) 
2. Rate of Growth 
of Population 
(% per year) 
3. late of Growth 
of Real GDP 
(% per year) 
4. Production of Wheat 
(Million Metric tons) 
5. Production of Rice 
(Million Metric tons) 
6. Production of Coarse 
Grains (Million Metric 
tons) 
7. Production of all 
Grains 
(Million Metric tons) 
8. Daily Calorie Intake 














































































































































































Fi,;;ures in parentheses denote the popul.':1.tion of each class ;:J.S a riror,crtion 
of the relevant total population. 
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to point to the rapid growth in population there as one of the major 
contributory causes. Rapid desertification, in part due to the abandonment 
of the traditional methods of cultivation and livestock management, shift 
of cropping patterns in favour of export crops, etc. have been attributed 
to population pressure (Talbot (1986). However, it is becoming 
increasingly cl~ar (Lele and Meyers (1986), Williams (1984)) that 
inappropriate government policies rather than population growth are 
largely responsible for the African tragedy. 
Another important renewable resource is the natural environment. It­
is asserted that rapid population growth will accelerate the degradation 
pf natural environment. There are two separate points to be made here. 
First, a number of serious environmental degradation problems arise from 
the production and consumption of commodities which are not only highly 
income elastic but also have environmental side effects. And, as in the 
case of exhaustible resources, the contribution of the growth of 
population per se to exacerbating this problem is not dominant. The 
second point ts that almost by definition many of the environmental 
problems arise from externalities that are not reflected in the private 
production and consumption decisions. As is well-known, with an 
appropriately defined property rights and a suitably defined set of taxes 
and subsidies the externalities could be internalised. It is argued that 
· the use of fossil fuels in developing countries exacerbates the carbon 
dioxide accumulation. Also, the deforestation associated with extension 
of food cultivation and use of firewood as fuel allegedly has led to 
changes in climatic conditions and soil erosion. Apart from the fact that 
the quantitative· estimates of th~ extent of such.degradation are extremely 
unreliable and their alleged negative effects, even if they are 
significant, questionable, once again, with a well-defined system of 
6
_ property rights and taxation, the negative effects could be contained. In 
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any case, the contribution of population growth to this phenomenon is 
exaggerated. 
4. CAPITAL ACCUMUI.ATION, TECHNICAL CHANGE AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
It has been claimed that rapid population growth diverts resources 
away from saving and toward current consumption through several channels 
(Coale and Hoover (1958)). A more rapid rate of growth of population 
leads to a larger share of children in total population. This is viewed 
as inducing households to consume a larger proportion of their income than· 
they otherwise would have done. A second channel is through public 
, 
expenditure on education and health. Once again, it is argued that. 
greater the proportion of children in the population, greater is the 
demand for education and health expenditures. With a given total budget 
these divert public resources from investment in physical capital. Yet 
another channel through which rapid population growth affects accumulation 
is through lower level of capital per worker in a steady state, thus 
reducing the level of steady state per capita consumption. A rough 
quantitative estimate of this effect can be obtained with a neo-classical 
growth model in which aggregate output is produced with a Cobb-Douglas 
production function. If capital owners do not consume and workers do not 
save, and if population and labor force grow at the same rate, then the 
elasticity of steady-state per capita consumption with respect to the rate 
of growth of population is -a:/1-a:,where a: is the elasticity of output with 
respect to capital. With a:= 0.25, this elasticity is a modest -0.33. 
If the decision regarding childbearing is not viewed as exogenous but 
subject to choice, then the fact that some societies or households have 
more children and less of material things may simply mean that the cost of 
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childbearing relative to material things is lower than in others, or that 
their preference ordering of children and material things is different. 
In this view there is nothing on welfare grounds that one can infer from 
differences in the rates of population growth or savings across societies. 
Second, the fact that in low income countries children support their 
parents in their old age because other forms of old age security are not 
available can be taken to imply that as development proceeds and financial 
instrwnents for saving and insurance become available, fertility will 
decline. Although this argument is indeed plausible, in theory it is not 
clear whether the motive for having children as providers of old age 
security will always lead households to have more children than otherwise 
(Srinivasan (1985). In the model of Becker and Barro (1985), the 
fertility of the altruistic household and population growth is only 
temporarily reduced by an expansion of social security. 
The likely determinants of saving are many and dependency ratio is 
only one of them. It is not surprising that the empirical evidence 
linking savings ratios and dependency ratios is not conclusive. Although 
Mason (1985) finds that available evidence from an international cross 
section supports the proposition that a higher dependency ratio leads to 
lower saving, he himself suggests that the analysis on which this 
conclusion is based does not address a number of important issues. In 
particular, there are very few studies of the impact of household 
composition on household consumption or saving in developing countries, 
and most studies are based on aggregate national level data and not data 
from micro household surveys. Most of the studies take into account only 
the resourc~ use implications of having more children and do not take into 
account the fact that in poor societies children also participate in labor 
force and generate income for the households. Taking both the resource 
I. 
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cost and income generation into account, whether the children are a net 
drag on savings is not empirically established conclusively. Mason 
cautiously concludes that the importance of demographic factors to 
national savings rates is likely to be the subject of continued debate. 
The impact on public investment once again needs to be qualified. 
First of all it would be misleading to view expenditures on health and 
education as consumption only. If anything, these expenditures are 
mostly, if not wholly, investments in human capital which will enhance the 
productivity of the ~orker. Second, there is very little empirical 
evidence which suggests that the share of government spending on health 
and education is influenced significantly by the dependency ratio. Third, 
in attempting to assess the effect of dependency ratio on public 
expenditures, one has also to take into account that households themselves 
devote part of their resources to provide for the health and education of 
their offspring. Disentangling the effect of dependency on public and 
private expenditures on education and health in a world in which fertility 
decisions themselves are endogenous requires building and estimating 
sophisticated econometric models. To jump to strong policy conclusions 
from observed associations between public expenditures and dependency 
ratios would be inappropriate.- In one of the more careful studies, 
Schultz (1987) analyzes data from a number of countries on enrollment 
rates and spending per student. He finds no effect of higher population 
growth on enrollment rates, while some negative effect on spending per 
student is discerned. He is cautious about placing excessive 
interpretation on rather weak results from a cross section. 
The argument that more rapid population growth will reduce the steady 
state capital per worker-is based on a very simple neoclassical growth 
model in which output is a constant return to scale function of capital 
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and labor. If workers do not save and capitalists do not consume, then in 
the steady state, per capita consumption will be at a maximum. Further, 
the rate of growth of output and the own rate of interest on capital will 
equal the rate of growth of the labor force, which in turn is equal to the 
rate of growth of population. It is evident in this model that a more 
rapid growth of population will increase the steady state rate of growth 
of output in the same proportion, but since the own rate of interest on 
capital also goes up by the same proportion, capital per worker and output 
per worker will be lower in the new steady state. Further, for 
maintaining capital stock per worker constant along the new steady state 
more of the output is devoted to gross investment, so that per capita 
consumption is lower. However, in this framework the rate of growth of 
population is exogenous. If the rate of growth of population is 
endogenous and one compared different economies which are along their 
steady states, it is not clear that one would observe a negative 
association between capital per worker and the equilibrium rate of growth 
of population. In any case, in the simple neoclassical models the economy 
is closed, not only with respect to trade and commodities, but also with 
respect to capital flows between countries. Once international capital 
flows are allowed, the analysis gets complicated (Deardorff (1985)). 
The neoclassical models of growth assume that technical change, if 
any, is exogenous to the process of capital accumulation and population 
growth. It has been argued by some that the innovation process itself is 
influenced by demographic factors. In particular, Boserup (1981) has 
argued that the technology of cultivation is influenced by population 
density. Simon (1981) argues that the rate of technical progress would be 
influenced by population-growth, basing themself on the argument that a 
larger population implies a larger amount of knowledge creation and also 
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that a larger population achieves economies of scale both in the 
production of goods and of knowledge. He suggests that more rapid growth 
of population may in fact enhance the rate of growth of technical 
progress. Binswanger and Pingali (19~4) find some empirical support for 
the Boserup thesis. Unfortunately, carefully conducted empirical studies 
of the determinants of technical progress are far too few to be able to 
judge the claims of Simon. The evidence he provides are suggestive but by 
no means conclusive. 
The impact of changes in the rate of growth of population on income 
distribution is another matter where there has been some debate in the 
literature. Although there is some evidence from cross section studies 
that income inequality is higher in countries with more rapid rate of 
growth of population,. there are a number of serious econometric and 
measurement problems that vitiate this analysis. In theory, one can of 
course associate greater income inequality with a more rapid rate of 
growth of population. For example, in the neoclassical growth model 
discussed earlier in which the capitalists do not consume and wage earners 
do not save, if one compared two economies with access to the same 
techno~pgy but with different rates of growth of population, both 
economies being on their steady state, the one with the higher rate of 
growth of popula~ion will have a lower wage share and a higher profit 
share. If wage earners are identified with the poor and the capitalists 
are identified with the rich, this suggests a deterioration in income 
distribution with increases in the rate of growth of population. 
Another argument that is often advanced is that the minority of rich 
households in poor countries have tended to be those households with low 
fertility, while the majority of the poor have high fertility. 
Reinforcing this is the association between parental income and 
I. 
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expenditures on improving child quality through education and health 
expenditures. If the poor not only have more children but also spend less 
on investment in human capital on each, then the poor would get poorer and 
the rich will get richer over time. However, this argument is much too 
simplistic. A prior question is an explanation of the differential 
fertility between the rich and the poor. This may merely reflect 
differential opportunities for investment. For example, if the poor invest 
in children as providers of old age security only because they have no 
access to other investments with higher yield, while the rich, because of 
their access to investment opportunities, not only invest more in them and 
less in their children but also spend more on their children's education, 
then the analysis should focus on the reasons for differential access to 
investment opportunities and not on the fertility differentials per se 
since the latter are endogenous. There are several theories attempting to 
explain why inequality in wealth distribution is much greater than the 
inequality in the income distribution. Becker's (1967) hypothesizes that 
individuals who are more able obtain systematically higher returns to 
investment and tend to become wealthier. Yitzhaki (1986) suggests that if 
relative risk aversion is decreasing in wealth (in itself a questionable 
proposition), the wealthier individuals will invest in relatively risky 
but higher yielding portfolios and as such expected returns per unit of 
investment will be increasing in wealth. Finally, Arrow (1986) shows that 
if the cost of acquiring information about the rates of returns to 
alternative investment is independent of the amount invested, then the 
optimal amount of information purchased by an investor will be an 
increasing function of wealth, leading to the distribution of final wealth 
being more unequal than initial wealth. In all this, fertility 
differentials play no role. 
,j 
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Another version of the fertility-based argument is that when 
opportunities for fertility reduction become available in a poor society, 
the rich make use of them first. Thus, at the early stages of development 
the benefit of fertility reduction is concentrated among the upper strata 
of society and as such income inequalities would increase. Of course, 
once the poor also avail themselves of the opportunities for fertility 
reduction, this process eventually has to reverse itself. Once again, one 
has to ask why it is that the rich make use of the knowledge first. If 
this is because of their greater access to publicly-provided knowledge and 
publicly-subsidized means of fertility reduction, then orte ha:s to address· 
the issue of differential access issue rather than focus on the resultant 
paths of fertility reduction of the two classes over time. 
5. IS THERE A CASE FOR A POPULATION POLICY? 
It is evident from historical data from the presently developed 
countries ~hat there was a demographic transition from high to low 
fertility associated with their economic development. It is also clear 
that the time span over which the transition took place varies among 
countries. If a similar transition can be expected in the developing 
countries and if it leads to a level of fertility which is considered 
appropriate, and if the time span over which the transition is likely to 
take place is also not too long from a social perspective, then one could 
argue that there is no reason for changing either the post-transition 
fertility or the pace at which the transition takes place through public 
policy. Demeny (1986) for one does not believe that the premises 
underlying this assertion are likely to hold. 
Families are the institutions whose fertility behavior determines the 
aggregate fertility outcome and hence the characteristics of the 
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transition. It is to the literature of the economics of the family that 
one has to turn for understanding the determinants of the transition. One 
_very influential strand of this literature (Becker (1981)) views the 
household as 'producing' the goods and services that it desires using 
inputs purchased from the market and the time available to its members. 
One major conclusion emerging from this approach is that the fertility 
behavior is largely influenced by the trend in the cost of children 
relative to other activities that generate household welfare. The cost of 
nurturing a child and investments in its quality are both influenced by 
the cost of the mother's time. To the extent that rising female labor 
participation rates and female wages are associated with economic 
development, a decline in fertility can be expected. Offsetting the 
tendency for the cost of a child to increase because of the increasing 
value of mother's time is the potential contribution to the family income 
that a child makes in low-income economies through their participation in 
household production and even market activities. It is thus possible 
(Lindert (1980)) that before the cost of a child increases through 
economic development, there may be initially a fall in this cost because 
of increased opportunities for household production. 
Attempts to quantify the effects of rising female wages on fertility 
have been made with historical data. For instance, Paul Schultz (1985) 
shows that a quarter of the decline in Swedish fertility from 1860 to 1910 
could be accounted for by the rising value of female time. 
The interaction between quality of children and the number of 
children and its impact on fertility decisions are complex. The benefits 
from having ~hildren and investing in their quality will accrue over a 
span of time in the future. Like all other investments, investment in 
children is also a hostage to fortune. The realization of the benefits of 
-22-
such investment depends on the fulfilment of an essentially implicit 
contract between children and their parents. Any threat by a parent on a 
child (or vice versa) imposes emotional costs on the parent as well as the 
child. As such, the threats are unlikely to be credible enforcement 
mechanisms. The emphasis on implicit contracts, incentives for evasion 
and the consequent need for costly monitoring distinguishes the 
"transactions cost approach" to families. In Pollak's characterization, 
this approach "views marriage as a 'governance structure,' emphasizes the 
role of 'bargaining' within families, and draws attention to the 
advantages and disadvantages of family organization in terms of il)centives 
~nd monitoring and to the special roles of 'altruism' and 'family 
loyalty'" (Pollak (1985), p. 605). 
Unfortunately, in the household production model and the transactions 
approach a major role is played by unobserved heterogeneity in household 
preferences, technology, inherited traits, etc. To derive testable 
hypotheses about parameters of models involving only observable variables 
from either theory involves assumptions about structural relations and 
about functional forms of the distribution of latent variables. As Willis 
(1986) points out, "we do not have as yet a body of empirically tested 
quantitatively stable estimates of the major behavioral relationships 
suggested by the theory," although "we do have a growing capacity to 
generate hypotheses about both large and small questions concerning family 
behavior and its consequences within a theoretical framework that is a 
logically coherent part of the main corpus of neoclassical economic 
theory." Until one has a firm empirical explanations of the factors 
influencing fertility behavior, attempts to influence such behavior 
through public policy are to a considerable extent misplaced. 
Demeny forcefully argues that externalities associated with 
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individual fertility behaviour are so pervasive that a population problem 
will arise in a laissez-faire equilibrium. One of his examples, that "a 
population problem exists when mx preference for children diminishes your 
access to steak," seems to confuse pecuniary externalities that have only 
distributional implications with externalities that arise from 
interdependent technologies or preferences.3 In theory, in the presence 
of the former, the laissez-faire equilibrium is pareto optimal, and as 
such any socially desired redistribution can be brought about through lump 
sum transfers. In the presence of the latter the laissez-faire equilibrium 
is not pareto optimal. However, as discussed earlier, the empirical 
evidence for a significant presence of the externalities of the latter 
kind is not overwhelming and in any case, the optimal policy interventions 
to address them are well known, although the feasibility of implementing 
them is a matter of debate, particularly from the point of view of 
acquiring the information needed to design the optimal policy. Indeed, if 
the information problem is sufficiently severe, there may not be any 
feasible policy intervention that improves social welfare compared to a 
laissez-faire equilibrium, let alone maximize it. 
T9 conclude, most of the arguments for a policy intervention in 
private household fertility decisions appear to be based either on an 
inappropriate association of undesirable social consequence due to other 
distortions in the society with individual fertility choices, or on 
associations that cannot be ruled out in theory but are empirically weak, 
if not exaggerated. But, if households are constrained in achieving their 
desired fertility because of lack of relevant information about means of 
fertility control, appropriate policy intervention to provide such 
information may be socially desirable. A case for publicly-supported 
dissemination of family planning information can be made on these grounds. 
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FOOTNOTES 
*I thank Paul Demeny and Paul Schultz for their comments on an 
earlier draft. 
lsince an individualistic SWF cannot be at a maximum if the 
allocation is not Pareto Optimal (PO), the question then reduces to 
whether any arbitrary PO allocation can be sustained as a competitive 
equilibrium. The second welfare theorem of neo-classical welfare 
economics asserts that under additional restrictive assumptions, including 
convexity of the set of production possibilities and individual 
preferences, this is possible provided redistribution of individual 
endowments or incomes through lump sum transfers is feasible. 
2This section draws on "Population and Food" in D. Gale Johnson and 
Ronald Lee (eds.), Population Growth and Economic Development, Washington, 
D.C., National Academy of Sciences (forthcoming). 
3rn private correspondence Paul Demeny has disputed any such 
confusion claiming that "uncoordinated demographic choices are likely to 
have an impact on income per capita over time. If the change is for the 
worse, lump sum transfers offer no remedy. The issue is not whether a 
Pareto optimum will be achieved--it may well be--nor where that optimum 
will lie. The issue is the size of the [Edgeworth] box: a weightier 
affair than mere distribution and optimal allocation." I am afraid that 
the problem is not one of (static) allocation versus dynamic growth. The 
problem is simply a pecuniary externality affecting inter-temporal choice 
and resource allocation. In prnciple, it is a distributional (across 
generations) issue amenable to standard remedies albeit involving 
intertemporal as well as contemporaneous transfers. 
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